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IS THERE A GLASS CEILING?
CHRISTINE JOLLS"
In the spring of 2001, I was asked by the Federalist Society at Har-
vard Law School to debate Diana Furchtgott-Roth, chief of staff of the
Council of Economic Advisers in the George NV. Bush Administration, on
the question of whether there is a "glass ceiling" for women in the labor
market. I was to argue in favor of the glass ceiling's existence, and she
was to take the opposing view. As those who attended know, the discus-
sion ranged broadly over widely varying terrain, including some ques-
tions that should be silly but apparently aren't-most memorably, whether it
is "mommy track" behavior to give one's nanny or babysitter a cell phone
number at which one can be reached while at work when one is away
from one's desk-to serious academic disputes over the underlying ex-
planations for women's present labor market position. This Essay, on the
occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Harvard Women's Law
Journal, attempts to summarize some of my views on the current state of
the glass ceiling debate.
An important threshold question concerns the definition of the "glass
ceiling." Former Senator Robert Dole once remarked that "there are
probably as many definitions of the glass ceiling as there are individuals
affected by it ' But I like the formulation he offered, and I shall adopt it
here. The glass ceiling issue, according to Dole, ultimately "boils down
to eliminating artificial barriers in the workplace which have served to
block the advancement of qualified women."2 In other words, if barriers
exist that "block the advancement of qualified women," then I shall say
that a glass ceiling is present.
I.
"Yes," I replied, unhesitatingly, when Ms. Furchtgott-Roth asked
whether I provided my children's caregiver with a cell phone number at
which I could be reached during work hours. (My husband, vice-
president of marketing at a large corporation, does the same.) "If, for ex-
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ample, one of our children were to need emergency stitches during the
work day and I happened to be out of my office for an extended period, I
would want to be reachable so that I would know what was happening
and be able to be present, and my husband feels the same way" I then
asked the same question of Ms. Furchtgott-Roth (whose economic posi-
tion would surely allow access to a cell phone for use in emergencies):
"Doesn't your children's caregiver have a cell phone number at which to
reach one or both parents at work?" "No" she replied. "I simply hire a
competent caregiver to begin with." (This is either an exact quote or a
very close paraphrase.) In Ms. Furchtgott-Roth's view, "serious" business
people cannot be interrupted with "home matters" during their work
hours.
This exchange was surprising to me on many levels. Part of the sur-
prise came from the way in which the exchange placed me in the entirely
new position of "perceived mommy tracker." I also chuckled in thinking
about how various Bush Administration officials would react if they had
been there to witness the exchange. But what was most surprising-and
disturbing-was the way in which the exchange demonstrated a vision of
the "appropriate worker" as one who was wholly unencumbered by life
outside of work. Even the tiny likelihood of an emergency phone call
from a child's caregiver, in Ms. Furchtgott-Roth's view, would radically
disrupt the worker's effectiveness and render him or her not "serious"
enough to hold down an important job.
The implications of such a vision for the glass ceiling debate,
defined as above, are rather obvious. From the empirically uncontrover-
sial notion that in today's world many women (not to mention men) are
not prepared to check all of their outside concerns at the office door, it is
but a quick leap to the conclusion, advanced by Ms. Furchtgott-Roth, that
women's current underrepresentation in high level jobs has everything to
do with women's "choices" and nothing whatsoever to do with glass
ceilings-understood, as stated above, as barriers that block women's
advancement despite their objective qualifications.
What is so striking about Ms. Furchtgott-Roth's picture is the way in
which the mere fact of parenthood (or, more to the point, motherhood),
with even its most minimal incidents, is enough to derail the worker's
chances of holding down a "serious" job. In Ms. Furchtgott-Roth's world,
even the employee who works full-time and has extremely reliable child-
care is not qualified for "serious" jobs if he or she so much as gives a
child's caregiver an emergency phone number. Almost every mother-
and, indeed, almost every reasonably involved parent-is likely to be on
the "mommy track" in this vision.
My own view of the glass ceiling issue is quite different. I believe-
and my belief is supported by the broad range of empirical evidence I
describe below-that an important part of the explanation for women's
present labor market position is the continued existence of unlawful em-
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ployment discrimination against women. Because many people seem un-
aware of the strength of the evidence of modem day sex discrimination in
labor markets, I will describe this evidence in some detail below. Given
the evidence, it simply cannot seriously be argued, in my view, that
women's labor market position is solely or largely a consequence of their
own "choices" rather than of the existence of glass ceilings in many sec-
tors of the economy. Without even getting into the complex topic of
women's "choices" and how we should regard these-an important sub-
ject on which I touch briefly in Part IV below-we should all be able to
agree, given the strength of the evidence, that unlawful sex discrimina-
tion plays an important role in determining women's failure to attain the
same level of job success as their male counterparts.
II.
Let's talk about the evidence of unlawful sex discrimination in mod-
em day labor markets, as that evidence is at the heart of my argument
here. The studies described below focus on a range of industries, and all
were published in top economics journals. They all reach the same con-
clusion-that sex discrimination in modern day labor markets is alive and
well despite the laws that prohibit it.
The orchestra study. The most prominent recent study of sex dis-
crimination in labor markets is the study published in 2000 in the Ameri-
can Economic Review, authored by Claudia Goldin of the Harvard Uni-
versity economics department and Cecelia Rouse of the Princeton Uni-
versity economics department. 3 Goldin and Rouse consider a wonderful
experiment: the effect of the move to blind auditions for the major American
symphony orchestras, most of which now choose their players by having
them audition behind a screen so that sex and other identifying charac-
teristics of the musicians are not apparent.4 In many cases orchestras even
take the step of rolling out carpets to "muffle footsteps that could betray
the sex of the candidate.'
5
Goldin and Rouse find that introduction of blind auditions substan-
tially increased the likelihood that a female candidate would advance out
of the preliminary round in an orchestra's selection process. 6 The move to
blind auditions also had a substantial effect on the ultimate likelihood
that a female candidate would be selected for an orchestra position.7
Goldin and Rouse conclude that "the switch to blind auditions can ex-
plain about one-third of the increase in the proportion female among new
3 Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of "Blind"
Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 Art. EcON. REv. 715 (2000).4Id. at 716, 721-22.
5Id. at 721.6Id. at 716.
71Id.
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hires" within the major symphony orchestras.8 Although Goldin and
Rouse's modest sample size means that some estimated coefficients do
not pass standard tests of statistical significance, the overall weight of the
evidence they present-which stems from a significant range of sources
and is studied a wide variety of ways-points convincingly to a substan-
tial effect on the sex composition of new orchestra hires of changing
from non-blind to blind audition procedures.9
Goldin and Rouse's careful study tells a story of discrimination that
seems very difficult to refute. To take just one example from their work,
when the very same female and male candidates were compared across
blind and non-blind auditions, the female candidates were substantially
more likely to succeed relative to male candidates in blind auditions as
compared to non-blind auditions. 0 In preliminary rounds with no
semifinals, for instance, 28.6% of female musicians were advanced in
blind auditions, compared to only 20.2% of male musicians, whereas
19.3% of female musicians were advanced in non-blind auditions, com-
pared to 22.5% of male musicians." In other words, the very same female
musicians were more likely than male musicians to advance in blind
auditions and less likely than those very same male musicians to advance
in non-blind auditions. It is hard to see what, other than discrimination,
could be driving this effect; the focus on the successes of the very same
musicians across blind and non-blind settings controls directly for un-
derlying musician quality. In terms of timing, the auditions studied oc-
curred from the late 1950s to 1995; 175 of the 254 auditions upon which
the authors' conclusions are based are from 1980 or later, and 73 are
from the 1990s.
1 2
The labor market discrimination suggested by Goldin and Rouse's
findings could perhaps be rational (in the sense of maximizing orches-
tras' returns or profits); it is possible, for instance, that existing players
might have better morale, and thus play better as a group, if they were
with "like" (male) individuals, and it is also possible that long-time pa-
trons of a traditionally male orchestra such as the Vienna Philharmonic
might be unsupportive of hiring female musicians. In such circumstances,
the orchestras' behavior would be rational, but nonetheless it would
clearly be unlawful.'
Reluctance to hire female musicians might also be rational for or-
chestras if, as a player for the Vienna Philharmonic once contended, fe-
male musicians would often take leave time because of pregnancy or
81d.
9 Id. at 737-38.
10 Id. at 726-27, 730.
11Id. at 727.
12 Id. at 724-25.
13 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L.
REv. 642, 686-87 (2001).
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have shorter tenures than their male counterparts, so that these musicians
would typically impose greater costs on orchestras than the average male
musician.14 However, Goldin and Rouse's data show that in the period
studied male and female musicians took statistically indistinguishable
numbers of medical and other leaves and did not appear to differ in their
tenures, at least in the direction posited by the account here. 5 Thus, cost
differentials of this sort cannot explain the treatment the female musi-
cians received.
Therefore, the Goldin and Rouse results provide strong evidence of
the persistence of substantial unlawful sex discrimination. Whether the
glass ceiling effects they uncovered for female musicians resulted from
discriminatory attitudes of fellow musicians, from discriminatory atti-
tudes of orchestra patrons, from inaccurate stereotypes about women's
leave-taking and tenure, or from some other cause, it is hard in light of
Goldin and Rouse's findings to deny the existence of unlawful sex-based
treatment of women as recently as the last decade.
The restaurant study. A second leading study of sex discrimination
in modem day labor markets is David Neumark's restaurant audit study,
published in 1996 in the Quarterly Journal of Economics.16 The audit
methodology involves the use of "testers"-individuals who are selected
to appear identical to one another except for the trait to be studied, gen-
erally sex or race. This methodology has a long pedigree in the housing
and employment contexts, which have been examined by the Urban In-
stitute and other researchers."7
The first step in Neumark's approach was to vary the sex of the
names on a set of fictional resumes and then examine the odds of appli-
cants' receiving interviews for waitstaff jobs at sixty-five Philadelphia
restaurants.'" The study took place in the spring of 1994. 9 Neumark's
methodology is tightly tethered to the question of unlawful sex discrimi-
nation because at the point at which the employer's decision to interview
is made, the only information in its possession is the resume, and thus
there is simply no plausible explanation other than unlawful discrimina-
tion for different interview frequencies in response to male versus female
resumes; this is so because each resume used in the study was sometimes
14 Goldin & Rouse, supra note 3, at 737 & n.55.
15 Id. at 737.
16 David Neumark, Sex Discrimination in Restaurant Hiring: An Audit Study. I I I Q. J.
ECON. 915 (1996).
17 See Harry Cross, Employer Hiring Practices: Differential Treatment of Hispanic and
Anglo Job Seekers, URn3. INmS. REP. 90-4 (1990); Margery Austin Turner. Michael Fix &
Raymond J. Struyk, Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Diminished: Racial Discrimina-
tion in Hiring, U.B. INST. REP. 91-9 (1991); Genevieve M. Kenney & Douglas A. Wis-
soker, An Analysis of the Correlates of Discrimination Facing Young Hispanic Job-Seekers.
84 Am. EcON. REv. 674 (1994); John Yinger, Measuring Racial Discrimination with Fair
Housing Audits: Caught in the Act, 76 AM. EcoN. REv. 881 (1986).
"1 Neumark, supra note 16, at 917, 920-23.
19 Id. at 923.
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associated with a male name and sometimes with a female name, so that
on average the set of male resumes and the set of female resumes were
identical. 20 Neumark's inquiry into restaurant hiring comes against the
backdrop of a significant gap between the earnings of full-time wait-
resses and full-time waiters, with the former earning about seventy-five
cents for every dollar earned by the latter.
2
1
Neumark's results are striking. Resumes with male names led to in-
terviews in sixty-one percent of cases at high-price restaurants (where
pay is higher than at middle- and low-price restaurants), whereas female
resumes led to interviews in only twenty-six percent of cases at such
restaurants.2 Clearly, high-price restaurants exhibited a strong preference
for waiters over waitresses with on-average-identical resumes. Other
findings reported by Neumark suggest that at least part of the reason for
this strong preference may lie in customer attitudes; "the proportion male
among the waitstaff is significantly positive related to the proportion
male among the clientele."23 However, the customer preference data was
gathered in a somewhat less rigorous manner than that underlying the
study's main results,24 and so more study would be useful before reading
a definitive conclusion. Still, the findings certainly suggest that customer
discrimination may play a role, and thus that, as in the orchestra study,
the observed sex differentials in the labor market cannot be attributed
solely to factors such as differential leave-taking behavior or tenure with
an employer. In light of Neumark's striking results, it is difficult to dis-
pute that glass ceiling effects provide at least part of the explanation for
the differing representations of waiters and waitresses at high-price res-
taurants in Philadelphia?
After establishing that male resumes are far more likely than (on-
average-identical) female resumes to lead to interviews, Neumark goes
on to examine the likelihood that male and female candidates ultimately
receive job offers. He finds, not surprisingly, that male candidates are far
more likely than female candidates ultimately to receive job offers at
high-price restaurants; males received offers in forty-eight percent of
cases, whereas females received offers in only nine percent of cases.26
These results are in principle more open to question than the interview
20 Id. at 920-21.
21 d. at 915-16.
2 Id. at 925, 931-32. See also id. at 930 (reporting multivariate regression results sug-
gesting the same conclusion).
23Id. at 919, 933-36.
24For a description of how the data on customer attitudes was gathered, see id. at 933.
25In the twelve high-price restaurants visited by researchers in conjunction with the
Neumark study, the approximate proportion of males among the restaurants' waitstaffs was
0.72. Id. at 933-34. By comparison, the proportion of males among the waitstaffs at the
nine low-price restaurants visited for the study was 0.39. Id.
26 d. at 925. See also id. at 930 (reporting multivariate regression results suggesting
the same conclusion).
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results, for different success rates could reflect the behavior or demeanor
of candidates during interviews; indeed, sometimes it is even suggested
that individuals interested in participating in discrimination studies may
also be individuals who (consciously or otherwise) end up behaving in
ways that lend support to the discrimination theory in which they believe.
However, the similarity between the interview disparities (which cannot
be attributed to candidates' behavior) and the offer disparities supports
the idea that discrimination may be driving the offer disparities. Thus, as
Neumark observes, while "one of the main purposes of studying [inter-
view frequencies] is to attempt to eliminate the effects of personality dif-
ferences or experimenter effects that are correlated with sex," the fact
that the "results for interviews ... are very similar to those for job of-
fers" means that personality differences and experimenter effects proba-
bly do not "drive the job offer results."27
Thus, the Neumark study, like the Goldin and Rouse study, provides
strong and, to my knowledge, unchallenged evidence of unlawful sex
discrimination in modem day labor markets. Ms. Furchtgott-Roth's only
response to these studies during our debate was the (to be perfectly blunt)
utter non sequitur that factors other than sex can explain some of the ob-
served differences between male and female job successes in modem day
labor markets. Well, of course they can in some instances (more on this
shortly); but the precise point of the Goldin/Rouse and Neumark findings
is that even after exhaustively controlling for factors other than sex
(which, everyone agrees, may differ), a significant sex differential re-
mains. That is what establishes the sex discrimination.
What is the cause of the sex discrimination revealed by the Goldin/
Rouse and Neumark studies? This discrimination need not reflect strong
dislike or disdain for female employees; instead, modem day sex dis-
crimination may well reflect more subtle causes (although it also may
not, as some of the eyebrow-raising cases discussed in Part III below re-
veal). Decision makers may, for instance, find certain behavior accept-
able in male employees but not in female employees, so that a broader set
of traits may be viewed as "consistent with the proper functioning of the
business" in the case of male employees than in the case of female em-
ployees. As just one illustration of this idea, when George Seltzer's book
Music Matters (cited by Goldin and Rouse) reports the "popular myth"
that female musicians are "more likely to demand special attention or
treatment, '' one wonders whether female musicians actually did demand
more special treatment in the experience of the persons adhering to this
view or whether, instead, the demands these women made were simply
27 1d at 925.
• GEORGE SELTZER, MusIc MATTERS: THE PERFORMER AND THE AMERICAN FEDERA-
TION OF MUSICIANS 213-14 (1989); Goldin & Rouse, supra note 3, at 719.
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more memorable or noteworthy against a background set of expectations
about appropriate behavior of male versus female musicians.
One of the best, most sensitive expressions of the complex processes
underlying much modem day sex discrimination may be the one that
came out of a Massachusetts Institute of Technology report written in
1999. As reported in a front-page New York Times article on the events in
question:
In an extraordinary admission, top officials at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, the most prestigious science and engi-
neering university in the country, have issued a report acknowl-
edging that female professors here suffer from pervasive, if un-
intentional, discrimination.
"I have always believed that contemporary gender discrimina-
tion within universities is part reality and part perception," the
university's president, Charles M. Vest, said in comments to be
published in the faculty newsletter within days and already
posted on the World Wide Web. "True, but I now understand
that reality is by far the greater part of the balance."
Dr. Vest's comments introduced a report about discrimination
against women in the School of Science, one of M.I.T.'s five
schools.2 9
The report, by a committee of male and female tenured School of Sci-
ence faculty members, contains a section entitled "How did inequities
come about? 'Gender Discrimination' in 1999." This section of the report
reads as follows (in pertinent part):
How ... might we explain what happened to the senior women
faculty in Science? While the reasons for discrimination are
complex, a critical part of the explanation lies in our collective
ignorance. We must accept that what happened to the tenured
women faculty in the School of Science is what discrimination
is.... [W]e, including for a long time the women faculty them-
selves, were slow to recognize and understand this for several
reasons. First, it did not look like what we thought discrimina-
tion looked like. Most of us thought that the Civil Rights laws
and Affirmative Action had solved gender 'discrimination.' But
gender discrimination turns out to take many forms and many of
these are not simple to recognize. Women faculty who lived the
experience came to see the pattern of difference in how their
2 Carey Goldberg, M.LT Acknowledges Bias Against Female Professors, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 23, 1999, at Al.
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male and female colleagues were treated and gradually they re-
alized that this was discrimination ....
The tenured women faculty ... made a discovery. They
identified the forms that gender "discrimination" takes in this
post-Civil-Rights era. They found that discrimination consists of
a pattern of powerful but unrecognized assumptions and atti-
tudes that work systematically against women faculty even in
light of obvious good will. Like many discoveries, at first it is
startling and unexpected. Once you "get it:' it seems almost ob-
vious.
30
Wage evidence. Alongside the empirical studies of discrimination
described above, a second way to approach the question of how women
and men are being treated in labor markets as an empirical matter is to
ask-as researchers have done in an enormous number of studies-how
well the substantial gap that exists between male and female pay can be
explained by factors such as the individual's experience, background,
education, and the type of employer at which the individual is employed,
so that the gap might be said to reflect one or more of these other factors
rather than sex discrimination.3' In the absence of controls for such other
factors, the raw ratio of female to male wages is presently approximately
0.7 to 1, not all that much different from the Old Testament ratio of 0.6 to
1: "[A] male from twenty years... to sixty years old ... shall be [valued
at] fifty shekels of silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary. [I]f it is a fe-
male, [she] shall be [valued at] thirty shekels."' 2
Of course, even if the male-female wage gap could be attributed (as
we will see it cannot) solely to factors such as experience, background,
education, and employer type, such a conclusion would not imply an ab-
sence of unlawful sex discrimination, as the Neumark study described
above makes clear. In that study, it might well have been the case that the
substantial pay gap between waiters and waitresses in Philadelphia could
be fully explained by the different types of restaurants at which they
tended to work, but the very fact that women were underrepresented at
the high-paying, high-price restaurants was itself, the study convincingly
demonstrated, a consequence at least in part of unlawful sex discrimina-
tion. Another example of the same point is that while the gap in the pay
of male and female top executives is, according to a recent study by
Marianne Bertrand and Kevin Hallock, less than five percent after con-
30A Study on the Status of Women Faculty in Science at MIT, MIT FAc. NEWSL., Mar.
1999, at 11-12 (on file with author).
31 See, e.g., GEORGE J. BORIAS, LABOR ECONOMucs 348 (1996) (discussing studies);
Robert G. Wood, Mary E. Corcoran & Paul N. Courant, Pay Differences Among the Highly
Paid: The Male-Female Earnings Gap in Laiyers 'Salaries. 11 J. LAB. EcoN. 417 (1993)
(study of male and female lawyers' pay).
32 BOEjAs, supra note 3 1, at 346; Leviticus 27:3-4.
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trolling for the size of the employer and various other factors, "[t]his ob-
viously does not imply the absence of discrimination" because the very
fact that female top executives are more common at small than large
firms could itself reflect discrimination.33 If, though, the wage gap in
many sectors cannot be explained by factors such as experience, back-
ground, education, and employer type, then the wage gap provides fur-
ther suggestive evidence of sex discrimination.
In fact, as Bertrand and Hallock note, most studies in this area have
"indeed identified an unexplained gender gap that cannot be attributed to
observable differences between men and women." George Borjas's la-
bor economics text describes two of the leading studies, each finding that
various factors can explain about two-thirds of the male-female gap,
leaving about one-third unexplained.
35
It is important not to make too much of these wage gap findings. The
difficulty with the evidence here is that it is difficult to be sure that all
non-sex differences-some of which may be subtle or difficult to ob-
serve-have been controlled for, and, unless all such differences have
been controlled for, the residual cannot properly be attributed to sex. 6
The control problem is precisely the reason that the audit methodology,
as well the orchestra audition experiment exploited by Goldin and Rouse,
leads to more definitive conclusions than the wage evidence. As Neumark
explains, "The purpose of an audit study is to provide much more direct
evidence on discrimination than is provided by other empirical methods.
... Unobservable differences between men and women are eliminated
... by matching their characteristics
37
A final point about the wage gap is important to note here. In addi-
tion to the general gap between male and female workers, there may be
an additional gap between the wages of women with children and those
without, as Ms. Furchtgott-Roth emphasized in our debate. 8 Jane Wald-
fogel calls this gap the "family gap."39 The existence of such a gap of
course does not negate the idea of substantial unlawful sex discrimination
in modern day labor markets (contrary to Ms. Furchtgott-Roth's repeated
suggestion during the debate, again apparently predicated on the non se-
quitur that the existence of some non-sex differences between men and
33 Marianne Bertrand & Kevin F. Hallock, The Gender Gap in Top Corporate Jobs, 55
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 17-18 (2001).
34Id. at 3-4.
35 BORjAS, supra note 31, at 348.36 Bertrand & Hallock, supra note 33, at 3-4; Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn,
Gender Differences in Pay, 14 J. EcoN. PERSP., Fall 2000, at 75, 82-83.
37 Neumark, supra note 16, at 917.
38 See generally DIANA FURCHTGoTT-RoTH & CHRISTINE STOLBA, WVOMEN'S FIGURES:
AN ILLUSTRATED GUIDE TO THE ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF WOMEN IN AlERICA 14-15
(1999); Jane Waldfogel, Understanding the "Family Gap" in Pay for Women with Chil.
dren, 12 J. EcON. PERSP., Winter 1998, at 137, 143-48.39Waldfogel, supra note 38, at 137.
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women (here differential caretaking burdens on mothers versus fathers)
somehow negates the possibility of other, sex-based differences). It is of
course perfectly obvious that the market may well punish women simply
for being women (the unlawful sex discrimination uncovered by the
Goldin/Rouse and Neumark studies and suggested by the wage evidence
described above) and in addition may impose an extra punishment on
women who have children, based either upon "true" differences between
them and other women or upon inaccurate or unfair stereotypes about the
effects of having children.
III.
As a contextual accompaniment to the general economics evidence
of sex discrimination described just above, the next portion of the discus-
sion describes some "on the ground" litigated employment discrimination
cases that provide a flavor of the real world events that lie behind the sta-
tistics. Bredesen v. Detroit Federation of Musicians,0 decided in Septem-
ber of 2001, involved sex discrimination by an orchestra, EEOC it Joe's
Stone Crab, Inc.," decided in August of 2000, involved sex discrimina-
tion by a restaurant; and Madison v. IBP, Inc.,' 2 decided in June of 2001,
involved sex discrimination by a leading American manufacturing firm of
the sort whose pay practices feature significantly in the empirical studies
of the wage gap. Each of these litigated cases provides a concrete and
textured picture of sex discrimination in modem day labor markets; they
are in this sense the lawyer's counterpart to the general economics evi-
dence discussed above.
Bredesen v. Detroit Federation of Musicians. This case involved dis-
crimination against an orchestra "house contractor" (whose duties are
described just below) employed by the Detroit Opera House. 3 The case
was brought against the Detroit Federation of Musicians, a union repre-
senting individuals employed by the Opera House, rather than against the
Opera House itself because the Federation (hereinafter referred to as the
"Union") negotiated Ms. Bredesen's terms of employment and because
these terms were reflected in a collective bargaining agreement between
the Union and the Opera House rather than in an employment contract to
which Bredesen herself was a signatory." The Union also represented
individuals employed at the Fisher and Fox Theatres in Detroit, the Ma-
sonic Temple, and the Detroit Symphony Orchestra (the relevance of
which will become clear just below).4.
40 165 F.Supp.2d 647 (E.D. Mich. 2001).41220 F.3d 1263 (1 lth Cir. 2000), on remand, 136 F.Supp.2d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
42257 F3d 780 (8th Cir. 2001).
4
1 Bredesen, 165 F.Supp.2d. at 648.
44See id. at 648-5 1.
45 Id. at 648-49 & n. 1.
2002]
Harvard Women's Law Journal
A "house contractor" is responsible for hiring needed musicians for
performances, ensuring that musicians understand performance schedules
and all other relevant information, enforcing dress codes, ensuring the
presence of all required players despite sickness or other reasons for ab-
sence, and serving generally as the musicians' liaison to the conductor
and the theatre. 46 While the house contractor for the Detroit Opera House
was female (Bredesen), the house contractor position was held by a man
at both the Fisher and Fox Theatres and the Masonic Temple.47 (The De-
troit Symphony did not utilize a house contractor.)48 When Bredesen was
initially offered the house contractor position at the Opera House, "[s]he
became the only woman to hold that position in any major Detroit area
venue, union or non-union, and the first woman in the Union's history to
hold that position.
49
Upon being offered the position, Bredesen asked the Union president
to negotiate a "double scale" salary for her as house contractor. 0 He de-
clined, stating that "all of the house contractors were paid the same rate
for such work, that this uniform rate was a single side-musician's scale,
and that the house contractor rate of pay was required by the Union to be
uniform at all venues so that they would not compete with another."' In
fact, however, it turned out that "all of the other Detroit area venues were
paying their house contractors-all males-double the regular side-
musician's scale."52 Thus, the plaintiff was being paid less than all of the
other house contractors, all of whom were men. Indeed, "[e]ven the
Macomb Center, a very small union venue, has always paid its house
contractor double scale."
53
In addition to her central claim of wage discrimination, Bredesen
contended that union officials tried to bully her into allowing them to
dictate her musician hiring decisions.' "When she proceeded to make her
own decisions without their input, [the Union president] become infuri-
ated with her, threatened to 'take away her job,' and told her that 'he was
going to get [her]' [and] said 'it's time the boys sit down and teach you a
lesson and teach you the way it has to be done,"' according to Bredesen's
testimony.55
None of this texture emerges from an economics study of sex dis-
crimination by symphony orchestras, and for this reason employment
discrimination cases provide a useful complement to the broader statisti-
46Id. at 649.47 1d.
48 1d. at 649 n.1.
49 d. at 649.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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cal studies summarized in Part II above. Bredesen's case gives a sense of
what goes on behind the scenes and the sorts of norms and cultural back-
ground that may lie behind the statistical findings.
EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc. A recent case from the restaurant
context is one brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) against Joe's Stone Crab, a "Miami Beach landmark" sea-
food restaurant 6 Joe's is, by the court's description, a classic high-price
restaurant of the sort examined in the Neumark study from above. Its
"distinctive menu" has traditionally been served by "tuxedo-clad men,"
and the restaurant has "maintained an 'Old'World' European tradition, in
which the highest level of food service is performed by men, in order to
create an ambience of 'fine dining' for its customers."'" The waitstaff at
Joe's enjoys a "generous salary and benefits package. '5
Consistent with Neumark's findings, prior to the EEOC's discrimi-
nation charge Joe's food service staff was "almost exclusively male. ' 9
"Indeed, one striking exception proves the rule. Dotty Malone worked as
a food server at Joe's for seventeen years, and for most of this time she
was the lone female on a serving staff that ranged between twenty-four
and thirty-two."'6 In the five years preceding the EEOC's discrimination
charge in 1991, Joe's hired 108 male servers and no female servers.61 Ms.
Furchtgott-Roth's claim during our debate that, contrary to my conten-
tion, Joe's has for long employed a large number of women-an allega-
tion she claimed was based on personally visiting Joe's and talking to the
owners-is simply impossible to reconcile with the unambiguous judicial
findings quoted here.
The expert witness hired by Joe's in the course of the litigation pro-
vides a fascinating window on the attitudes that lie behind sex discrimi-
nation in the restaurant industry.
[I]n all of the grade three restaurants in Europe, there is an im-
pression that service at that high level is the environment of
men, and that it ought to be that way. And I think that that atti-
tude a few decades ago came and was felt a little bit here in this
country .... Those [European] opinions and those sensibilities,
I think were in fact carried here by restaurateurs who hoped to
create something serious. If you wanted to create a serious res-
taurant that would become known in the community, that would
5EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2000). on remand,
136 F.Supp.2d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (finding that restaurant had cngagcd in intentional sex
discrimination).
-5 Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d at 1269-70.
5S Id. at 1268.
59 Id. at 1269.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 1271.
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become one of the community's great restaurants, you did what
they did in Europe, you modeled yourself after them.62
As the discussion just below (of Madison v. IBP, Inc.) makes clear,
the idea that women are simply not suited for certain positions-posi-
tions that happen to pay better than the positions they will otherwise be
occupying-is certainly not unique to the restaurant industry. Vicki
Schultz, in her classic 1990 article Telling Stories About Women and
Work,63 offers a number of wonderful examples. 61 What is especially dis-
turbing about the Madison case described just below, however, is that the
behavior-similar to that in several of Schultz's accounts-occurred in
the 1990s rather than one to two decades earlier.
Madison v. IBP, Inc. The employer in this case, which was decided
in 2001, is the world's leading producer of beef and pork products. 65 IBP
hired Sheri Madison in 1989 to work in its plant in Perry, Iowa.66 Madi-
son's tenure at the firm was marked by repeated rebuffs-often justified
explicitly in sex-based terms-of attempts on her part to move into posi-
tions that might expand her knowledge base and offer her greater respon-
sibility and pay. Setting the overall tone of the environment was general
supervisor Larry Sippel, who referred to female employees as "whores"
and "dykes," stated that "women don't belong in packinghouses" and
maintained that female employees "can't do physical jobs"'67
One of Madison's attempts to transfer positions came when she asked
to learn shank boning. "[S]upervisors John McNamara and Eugene Jack-
son told her that shank boning was a 'man's job' and that women were
not capable of doing it."68 These supervisors then determined that she
would be permitted to switch jobs only if she obtained a certification that
was not typically required of male workers.69 Madison "experienced a
substantial delay in receiving a pay increase because she was required to
go through a certification process."70
By December 1993, Madison "applied for, and was denied, at least
nine different promotions" 71 "She was often passed over in favor of male
employees with less job knowledge and seniority. '72 For example, "[i]n
November 1993, Madison applied for a ... position which was eventu-
62 Id. at 1270.
63 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of
Sex Segregation in the Workplace in 7Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument,
103 HARV. L. Rav. 1749 (1990).
6See, e.g., id. at 1784-87.
65 Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F.3d 780, 785 (8th Cir. 2001).
66Id.
67 Id. at 785-86.
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ally awarded to a male coworker.'73 "Madison was told that her coworker
received the job because he had better... skills, more seniority, a better
attendance record, and greater job knowledge."7 But when management
reviewed both personnel files after Madison complained about the deci-
sion, it found that "the male employee actually had a significant disci-
pline and absentee record."75
"Madison continued to bid for open management support jobs, but
she was passed over in favor of male employees, including one who had
been fired three years earlier for excessive absenteeism: '7 6 Posts for
which she applied "were usually awarded to males with less seniority,
less experience, and poor personnel records"n "She eventually stopped
applying for promotions in July 1997, by which time she had unsuccess-
fully applied for at least 23 promotions.' 78 Little, it appears, has changed,
at least at IBP, from the memorable account given by a female pipefitter
almost twenty years ago and quoted in Schultz's article:
For a long time I wasn't allowed to do certain types of jobs ....
Some of the men would take the tools out of my hands. You see
it is just very hard for them to work with me because they're
really into proving their masculinity and being tough. And when
a woman comes on a job that can work, get something done as
fast and efficiently, as well, as they can, it really affects them.




The material discussed in Parts II and III above shows that sex dis-
crimination of various forms is not an artifact of the past. This conclu-
sion alone is enough to establish that, to an important extent, there re-
mains a serious glass ceiling for women in the labor market. Women are
prevented by discrimination from attaining positions that are higher level,
and pay more, than the ones they have traditionally occupied. The evi-
dence described above establishes beyond what I consider to be reason-
able dispute that in a meaningful set of cases, if absolutely nothing were




76 d. at 788.
7nId& at 789.
78 Id.
79 Schultz, supra note 63, at 1836-37 (quoting J. SCHROEDEL, ALONE IN A CROWD:
WOMEN IN THE TRADES TELL THEIR STORIES 20-21 (1985)).
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occurred in the candidate's personality, background, education, experi-
ence, expected tenure, expected leave behavior, and so forth-she would
nonetheless have significantly better employment opportunities as a male.
Of course, the opposite may be true in some circumstances, but the evi-
dence described above shows the existence of a substantial effect in favor
of men and against women.
But things actually get even worse. Not only does such sex discrimi-
nation persist, but this discrimination also may be part of the cause of
other, "objective" sex differences that in turn help to produce a prefer-
ence for male candidates in labor markets. To take just one concrete ex-
ample, recall the earlier discussion of potential leave-taking and tenure
differences between male and female musicians in major symphony or-
chestras. Goldin and Rouse's study concluded that such differences did
not exist, but suppose that the opposite had been true and that such dif-
ferences had existed alongside the orchestras' apparent preference for
men on other grounds (as shown by the study). The (hypothetical) differ-
ences in leave-taking and tenure could precisely have been caused by the
other forms of sex discrimination exhibited by the orchestras. Suppose,
for example, that I am a female musician married to a male musician and
that we are trying to decide who should take a leave to care for our new-
born child, or that we are trying to decide whether one of us should be
willing to leave our current orchestra to allow the other to move to a new
city for a better career opportunity. Surely, in any rational world, deci-
sions such as these will be influenced at least in part by the financial
ramifications of the alternatives. If, because of sex discrimination in or-
chestra hiring, female musicians will have fewer opportunities and earn
less than their male counterparts, then it makes perfect financial sense for
the female rather than the male musician in my example to take the leave
or depart from her current employer to provide her better-situated partner
with greater career opportunities. And, of course, against this backdrop,
it is also natural for aspirations and values to develop such that male em-
ployees, more so than female employees, view career advancement as
central to their identities and life goals.80 In such a setting employers will
naturally, and for perfectly good reasons, tend to prefer male employees
to female employees.
The point here is not, of course, that only such financial considera-
tions will drive career decisions between partners. (Also, the discussion
here is obviously limited in scope to opposite-sex partners.) One might
conceive, for instance, of a norm of egalitarianism that says something
80 Cf George A. Akerlof & William T. Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cog-
nitive Dissonance, in AN EcONoMIc THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES: ESSAYS THAT ENTER-
TAIN THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEW ASSUMPTIONS IN ECONOMIc THEORY 123, 125 (George
A. Akerlof ed., 1984) ("[Pleople prefer to believe that their work is safe [because] [t]hose
who ... believe the job is safe do not experience the unpleasant feelings of constant fear or
unsettling doubts about how wise it was to take such a dangerous job.").
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like "because the market is discriminatory and therefore under-recognizes
your skills and talents relative to mine, I will compensate you by taking
leave or not asking you to move so as to avoid an even further sacrifice of
your professional opportunities." But (among other things) not all cou-
ples may have the luxury of making decisions that go against their
financial self-interest; indeed, one thing that is striking in popular por-
trayals of "stay at home" fathers is the central role that financial consid-
erations often play in shaping the decision to have the father at home. As
one such dad, quoted in a recent New York Times article, put it in de-
scribing his and his wife's decision, "We didn't want to go the day care
route and with her having the better salary potential, we decided I'd quit
work and stay home?'81 Another "stay at home" father quoted in the arti-
cle was Christopher Coby, who "had two kids in diapers at once" and
quit teaching elementary school after his son was born because "his wife,
who works for a consulting firm, had a higher salary and better benefits. ' 2
The idea that financial costs and benefits will factor into decisions
about female versus male career choices ultimately is eminently com-
mon-sensical and seems unlikely to be contested except perhaps by those
holding extreme essentialist views of the "natural" orientations of men
and women toward caretaking responsibilities. (And those holding such
views might be intrigued to hear that Christopher Coby, the "stay at
home" dad quoted above who managed two kids in diapers at once, is a
6-foot-2, 215-pound former tank commander in the Army reserves who
owns an apron that reads, "Women want me. Martha Stewart fears me.') 83
It is hard in the end to avoid the conclusion that reduced career opportu-
nities for women on account of sex discrimination in labor markets will
play a real role in shaping the "choices" that both women and men make
about balancing career and family responsibilities.
Even if one rejects extreme essentialist views of the "natural" roles
of men and women, one might believe (as I do not) that women "natu-
rally" or for some other non-labor-market reason take on somewhat more
than fifty percent, even if not the lion's share, of family or home respon-
sibilities; indeed a major theme for many audience members at the Fed-
eralist Society debate was the idea that legal scholars and policymakers
need to think creatively about revamping the workplace to be more hos-
pitable to the demands of (depending on who was making the argument)
"mothers" or "parents:' Mary Jo Frug, of course, developed this basic
theme about the workplace treatment of "mothers" over twenty years ago.8
91 Rick Marin, At-Home Fathers Step Out To Find They Are Not Alone. N.Y. TuMEs.
Jan. 2,2000, § 1, at 1, 18.
82 J&L
83Id.
84 Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to Work-
ing Mothers, 59 BOSTON UNiv. L. REv. 55, 55-59, 94-103 (1979).
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My own approach to this question is different. I think it is critical to
distinguish between, on the one hand, extra caretaking-type responsibili-
ties taken on by women as a rational response to the sorts of labor market
sex discrimination documented above, and, on the other hand, extra
caretaking-type responsibilities taken on by women for other reasons. To
the extent that labor market discrimination of the sort documented above
is part of the cause of women's extra caretaking role, I would very much
prefer to see the law strike out aggressively against this discrimination
(more aggressively than it presently does) than to see us embark upon the
highly complex and very politically fraught task of "restructuring the
workplace" as a way of improving women's position. My central reason
for saying this is that while virtually everyone can agree that the sorts of
discrimination documented in Parts II and III above are worthy of the
highest degree of condemnation by the law,85 and while we can thus eas-
ily attain both consensus and a high degree of energy around that goal-a
goal that I believe is greatly underrecognized in current policy debates
about labor markets-the idea of "restructuring the workplace" to im-
prove women's position is controversial for a great many reasons; these
include the enormous economic complexities raised by the strategy and
the serious risk that the very framing of the question in this way will
reify and cement existing sex-based attitudes toward caretaking responsi-
bilities. Thus, my strong preference-which I cannot hope to defend
fully here-is first to solve the "everyone agrees" problem of uncontro-
verted sex discrimination in labor markets, a problem whose seriousness
I hope to have demonstrated above; then to give the solution time to take
root in women's and men's consciousness and to shape their values and
aspirations for the workplace and the home; and only then, if needed, to
consider embarking upon the more thorny and politically fraught inquiry
into "workplace restructuring" as a way of improving women's labor
market position.
85 Richard Epstein is a rare exception to the consensus. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FOR-
BIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS xii (1992)
("There is no adequate theoretical foundation or practical justification for the employment
discrimination laws. The strong national commitment to the aggressive enforcement of the
antidiscrimination law is, I believe, mistaken.").
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